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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is found in Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-3 (1952 as amended). Authority for this appeal is 
found in The Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CASE CITATIONS 
Issues to be Decided 
1 - Whether the trial court erred by granting Summary 
Judgment to the Plaintiff; 
2 - Whether the trial court erred by finding that no 
Prescriptive Easement existed over Plaintiff's property and denying 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review and Case Citations 
On review of the Trial Court's grant of Summary Judgment the 
Court of Appeals should only let the judgment stand when viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Aird Insurance Agency v. Zions First 
National Bank. 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
An attempt to assert and establish an interest in land, the legal 
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title to which is vested in another, is a proceeding in equity. It is the 
duty and prerogative of the reviewing court to review both the law 
and facts, and to consider the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 
Richins v. Struhs 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1966). 
The standard of review for the Court's Findings of Fact is for 
correctness. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 
1985), Charlton v. Hackett. 11 Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Citations only are provided on this page. Cited Statutes are 
included in the addendum. 
Revised Statutes 1933 §101-4-5(1) 
Revised Statutes 1943 §101-4-5(1) 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-6 (1975) 
Utah Code Annotated §57-3-2 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-102(c) (1975) 
Utah Code Annotated §77-3-101 (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Judgment being appealed from is a Summary Judgment 
granted in favor of the Plaintiff and denying Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Judgment recognizes the Plaintiff's right to 
exclude the Defendants from his property and does not recognize the 
prescriptive easement claimed by the Defendants. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Proceedings were held before the Honorable Ray M. Harding, 
Fourth District Court Judge for Utah County, specifically in Provo City, 
Utah. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary on November 28, 1990. 
Defendant's filed a response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants on 
December 27, 1990. On February 21, 1991, Plaintiffs responded to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. A request for oral 
argument was made March 4, 1993. A Memorandum Decision was 
issued on March 27, 1991. No oral argument was permitted prior to 
the decision. On April 02, 1991, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Reconsider. Plaintiff's filed a Memorandum opposing this on April 8, 
1991. A Memorandum Decision was issued on April 11, 1991, along 
with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree. On April 
11, 1991 Defendant's filed a response to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and a Request for 
ruling. April 29, 1991, a letter was sent to the parties denying the 
Motion to Reconsider. Further proceedings were Order to Show Cause 
hearings resulting in the case being closed by Order of Dismissal on 
May 24, 1993. A copy of the Docket Report is Attached as 
Addendum A. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court: 
The Trial Court granted Judgment for the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 27, 1991. A 
final Decree was entered based on this judgment on April 11, 1991, 
with accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Exhibit "A" Attached to the Deposition of Howard G. Miller 
is a true and correct copy of the Utah County Plat maintained in the 
office of the Utah County Recorder at Provo, Utah, depicting Section 3, 
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Township 9 South, Range 1 West, SLM. 
2. Exhibit "B" attached to the Deposition of Howard G. Miller 
is a true and correct copy of the Utah County Plat maintained in the 
office of the Utah County Recorder at Provo, Utah, depicting Section 
34, Township 9 South, Range 1 West, SLM. [A drawing, not to scale of 
the disputed area was attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the map is 
attached as Addendum "C" to this brief for a picture representation 
of ownership of the parcels in question. It should be noted that the 
official Utah County Plat lists Bethel Drissel as owner of N274, the 
hand drawn map shows the Greens as the owner of N274. N274 is 
leased to Green not owned by Green.] 
3. Defendant's Bill Stansfield and Joe Stansfield are the 
owners of a one-half interest in a 7/8s interest in 69.40 acres of land 
shown on Exhibit B as property Serial Number N274-A(Stansfield 
Property). (Deposition Exhibit 1 of Howard G. Millers' Exhibit.) 
4. Appellees estate was a contract purchaser and was in 
possession of property Serial Number N390-B (Green Property) on 
Exhibit B. (Affidavit of Duane Green in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This property is currently held by 
substituted Plaintiff, Ethel Green, as Personal Representative of the 
estate of Duane Green.) 
5. Property Serial Number N390-A (Miller Property) shown 
on Exhibit A was, at the inception of this action, was owned by Hazel 
PAGE -5-
M. Jensen, Howard G. Miller, Jake A. Sorensen and Virginia H. Horton. 
(Exhibit 1 to the Deposition of Howard G. Miller.) 
6. Property Serial No. N390-C (Glen Jensen's Property) 
shown on Exhibit A appears in the name of Glen Jensen. (Exhibit 1 to 
the Deposition of Howard G. Miller.) 
7. Property Serial Number N390-B (Melba Jensen's 
Property) shown on Exhibit A in the name of Melba P. Jensen. This 
property is being purchased by Plaintiff and or Plaintiff's estate. 
(Exhibit 1 to the Deposition of Howard G. Miller, and Affidavit of 
Duane Green in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
8. The irrigation water which is part of the subject matter of 
this litigation is water which was historically used to irrigate Parcel 
N390-A (Howard Miller's Property) and has been used by reason of 
the ownership of 24-5/6 shares of stock in the Goshen Irrigation and 
Canal Company. (Deposition of Howard G. Miller at page 10.) 
9. Howard G. Miller and his father farmed parcel N390-A 
(Howard Miller's Property) from 1946 to 1958. (Deposition of 
Howard G. Miller at page 5.) 
10. From 1958 to 1978 Howard Miller farmed parcel N390-A 
(Miller's Property) on his own. (Deposition of Howard G. Miller at 
page 5.) 
11 . Since 1976 Howard Miller has owned an interest in Parcel 
N390-A (Miller Property). From 1976 to 1978 he leased that portion 
of the interest in the land that he did not own, and farmed that 
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parcel of land. (Deposition of Howard G. Miller at page 16). 
12. Since 1978, Parcel N390-A (Property of Miller) has been 
farmed by lessee George Kirk. (Deposition of Howard G. Miller at page 
6.) 
13. The water evidenced by Certificate 574 in Howard 
Miller's name usually entitled the owner to more than sufficient 
water to irrigate Parcel N390-A (Miller Property). (Deposition of 
Howard G. Miller at page 22-23.) 
14. Howard Miller and his father constructed the ditch in 
question 1947 or 1948. (Miller deposition p. 22) The ditch runs 
across the north end of parcel N390-A (Property of Howard Miller). 
The ditch then traverses parcels N390-C (Property of Glen Jensen) 
then across N390-B (Property of the Estate of Duane Green under 
purchase contract from Melba Jensen) and finally the ditch emptied 
into N274-A (The Stansfield's property.) The ditch does not cross 
parcel N274 (Property of Bethel W. Drissel which is now leased by 
Greens.) (Affidavit of Howard G. Miller.) 
15. Parcel N390-B (Property of the Estate of Duane Green 
under purchase contract from Melba Jensen) was owned by Harold 
Jensen in 1947 or 1948 when the ditch was constructed by Howard 
Miller and his father. (Deposition of Howard Miller.) Harold Jensen 
died on September 3, 1951. (Death Certificate of Harold Jensen 
attached to Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Their 
Motion for Summary judgment and in Response to Plaintiff's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment.) 
16. The ditch was constructed and maintained across parcels 
N390-C (Property of Glen Jensen) then across N390-B (Property of 
the Estate of Duane Green under purchase contract from Melba 
Jensen) with the permission of the owners of the properties. 
(Deposition of Howard G. Miller at 22 and 23). 
17. Excess water, not waste water, was conveyed through the 
ditch from parcel N390-A (Property of Howard Miller) across parcels 
N390-B (Property of Glen Jensen) and N390-C (Property of the Estate 
of Duane Green under purchase contract from Melba Jensen) to 
parcel N274-A (Formerly owned by Howard Miller and now owned 
by the Stansfields). At times, the entire flow of water was conveyed 
to parcel N274-A. (Formerly owned by Howard Miller and now 
owned by the Stansfields). (Affidavit of Howard Miller). 
18. The water represented by Certificate Number 574 is not 
appurtenant to Parcel N390-A (Property of Howard Miller) 
(Deposition of Howard G. Miller at page 23). 
19. When Howard Miller sold Parcel N274-A (The Stansfield's 
Property) to the Stansfields, he showed them the ditch and told them 
that they could use the ditch to convey water to the parcel. 
(Deposition of Howard Miller at pp. 16-17.) 
20. Defendant's own water shares in the Goshen Irrigation 
and Canal Company, which is available to them to run across the 
ditch on the Plaintiff's property. (Stansfield's Affidavit attached to 
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Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2 1 . The ditch across Plaintiff's property is the only 
reasonable means the Stansfields have to water their property, 
N274-A. Water on the property is used to increase feed for 
Stansfield Cattle kept on the property. (Deposition of Howard Miller 
p. 22). 
22. Howard Miller obtained permission from Harold Jensen to 
construct the ditch. (Deposition of Howard Miller p. 22). Howard 
Miller never sought nor obtained permission from Melba Jensen to 
use the ditch. (Deposition of Howard Miller.) 
23 . The ditch was in use from 1951 through 1978 by Howard 
Miller in conjunction with his father and by Howard Miller solely. 
(See factual statements 9 and 10). From 1951 through 1978 is a 
period of more than 20 years. 
24. Duane Green lived in Goshen for upwards of twenty 
years. He farmed and raised cattle in the area and was familiar with 
the property in question before he bought it. (Affidavit of Howard 
Miller in support of the Stansfield's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
I ' s 10 & 11.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Stansfields have acquired a prescriptive easement 
in Parcel N390-B and are entitled to a Decree Quieting Title 
to the Easement for them. 
A. To acquire a prescriptive easement, four elements 
must be established. They are a use that is 1) Open, 2) 
Notorious, 3) Adverse and 4) Continuous for at least 
twenty years. 
II. Title to the property owned by Harold Jensen passed 
to his wife and heirs upon his death in 1951. 
A. Utah Statute provides for the automatic passing of land to 
the heirs of the decedent upon the death of the decedent. 
III. Harold Jensen's grant of permission to use the 
property for a ditch amounts to the grant of an easement 
which was never recorded. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Stansfields have acquired a prescriptive easement 
and are entitled to a Decree Quieting Title to the Easement 
for them. 
The ditch at issue in this case is not a well defined concrete 
ditch. Like many things in the rural community of Goshen the ditch 
is a utilitarian ditch dug by the local farmers to transport water from 
one field to another. It is a ditch brought about by the practicalities 
of the area. Howard Miller owned a parcel of land he irrigated with 
water from the Goshen Irrigation Company. He also owned some 
other property that was close to the property but not adjacent to it. 
The first parcel and the second parcel were separated by two parcels 
owned by neighboring farmers. Howard Miller and his father 
approached the owners of these properties and obtained permission 
to dig a ditch. Both owners readily consented to the ditch as a 
neighborly gesture. As with many things in the rural farming 
community the deal was sealed with a gentlemen's handshake rather 
than a lawyer's pen. A small ditch was dug by Howard Miller and his 
father using shovels. Without the ditch parcel N274-A didn't have 
an adequate source of water. Without water the feed on the land 
wasn't sufficient to support as many cattle as it would if irrigated. 
The ditch allowed excess water, and sometimes all of the water from 
an irrigation turn, from Howard Miller's first parcel of land to be 
transported to his second parcel of land. Most of the time some 
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water would be sent to the second parcel. At other times the entire 
turn of water would be sent to the second parcel. 
In 1951 Harold Jensen died. Harold Jensen was survived by 
his wife, Melba Jensen and three children. Upon the death of Harold 
she became an owner of his real property. Use of the ditch continued 
by Howard Miller and his father without the permission of Melba 
Jensen or the other owners. Permission was never sought from the 
new owners and it was never given. 
The ditch was used each irrigation season from the time it was 
dug until 1978 when Howard Miller quit farming. The ditch was 
then used by George Kirk, Howard Miller's lessee, for the same 
purpose and in the same manner as Howard Miller used the ditch. 
Use of the ditch continued until Duane Green purchased the land 
from Melba Jensen and decided to block the easement and turn the 
water to his own use in about 1989. Once the use of the ditch was 
blocked trouble started which has led to this litigation. 
A. To acquire a prescriptive easement, four elements 
must be established. They are a use that is 1) Open, 2) 
Notorious, 3) Adverse and 4) Continuous for at least 
twenty years. 
The requirements for a Prescriptive Easement are set out in 
Marchant v. Park City, 788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990), See also 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (1981). All four conditions must 
be met for a party seeking a Prescriptive Easement to prevail. In 
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Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment he concedes the use is open, notorious and 
continuous for at least twenty years. Continuous use in this case is a 
seasonal use each irrigating season. Richards v. Pines Ranch, 559 
P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977)(The use need not be regular or constant.) 
The Stansfields propose that the uncontradicted facts also show 
that the use has been adverse since 1951 when Melba Jensen 
acquired the property. Howard Miller and his father initially dug 
the ditch in 1947 or 1948. At that time they obtained permission 
from Harold Jensen to dig the ditch. This is the same property which 
the Estate of Duane Green is now purchasing from Melba Jensen. If 
this was all the facts it would appear that the use was permissive 
and no prescriptive easement could lie. However, there are 
additional facts which are key to this litigation. Harold Jensen died 
in 1951. Upon his death his ownership of the property necessarily 
ceased. The new owners never gave their permission to use the 
ditch. Therefore, the prescriptive easement period began to run in 
1951 and vested in 1971. Since 1971 the Stansfields easement has 
been perfected. 
When a party uses the land of another there is a presumption 
of adverse use. The owner has the burden to show that the use was 
under permission as distinguished from against it. Lunt v. Kitchens, 
123 Utah 488, 491, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953). Thus, in this 
case it is incumbent upon Plaintiff to show that the use was 
PAGE -13-
permissive as to owners after Harold Jensen. Once the owner brings 
forth evidence to show the initial use was permissive, the party 
claiming that the use was adverse must show an adverse use as to 
the owner. Richins v. Struhs. 412 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966). In the 
case at bar, the initial owner of the land gave permission to use the 
land. The subsequent owners didn't. Permissive or hostile use as to 
subsequent owners is an open issue and is a material question of fact 
which precludes summary judgment. 
Plaintiff cited cases to the Trial Court for the proposition that: 
"An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring 
from a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired 
adversely. It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a license or 
mere neighborly accommodation." Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 
1070, 1073 (Utah 1935). 
Plaintiff also cited another case holding that a use which begins 
as permissive and later becomes adverse must be proved by the 
party asserting that the use was adverse. Savage v. Nielsenu, 197 
P.2d 117 (Utah 1948). In the case at bar the Stansfields are not 
claiming a hostile use as against Harold Jensen. The adverse use is 
alleged against subsequent owners. Transfer of ownership and a 
claim against the new owner is the element Stansfields rely on to 
establish hostile use. 
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In Richins v. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966), two 
brothers-in-law owned adjacent parcels of property. They 
constructed one driveway to service both properties. They allowed 
the other the full use of the driveway. Some forty plus years later, 
subsequent purchasers owned both parcels. One of the subsequent 
owners constructed a fence on the property line, effectively 
precluding his neighbor from the use of the driveway. The Supreme 
Court found a Prescriptive Easement in favor of the neighbor, despite 
the initial permissive use of the prior owners. The Court held: 
"Even though it is sometimes referred to as a hostile use, 
it is not necessary that there be any open hostility manifest in 
the use of force or any overt physical or verbal opposition . . . 
The fact that the parties (predecessors) were friendly, or even 
cordial with each other, as they appear to have been, doesn't 
prevent a prescriptive right coming into being." Richards v. 
Struhs., 17 Utah 2d 356 412 P.2d 314, 316 (1966). 
Although permission was initially granted to dig and convey 
water though the ditch, the ownership of the parcel in question 
changed hands in 1951. The subsequent owner never gave 
permission. Therefore, the use has been adverse as to the Jensens 
and Duane Green for a period of time far in excess of the twenty year 
prescriptive easement. This ditch has been going across the same 
property for almost forty years. During most of the forty years the 
use has been adverse. If the owner of the property had objections to 
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the use of the ditch those objections should have been made known 
within the twenty year period. The twenty year period passed. The 
owners sat on their rights to preclude use. It is now too late for 
Duane Green or his estate to preclude the Stansfield's use of the 
ditch. This ditch has been used for over forty years. The right to 
continue using it is protected by the prescriptive easement. It is 
incumbent upon the judicial system to recognize that a use 
maintained for such a long period of time be allowed to continue 
when the elements for a prescriptive easement have been met. 
The Plaintiff's below asserted that the Stansfields could not 
obtain a prescriptive easement in the water. This claim does not 
address the issue in this case. The Stansfields claim a prescriptive 
easement in the land forming the ditch so that water can be 
conveyed through the ditch to water property that has no other 
source of water. Whether they obtain excess water from Howard 
Miller, Howard Miller's lessee, water falling from the sky or whether 
their own water from the Goshen Irrigation Company it makes no 
difference. The Stansfields have a right to use the land forming the 
ditch to convey water. The question before the Court is one of the 
right to use the land (ditch) to convey the water; not where the 
water comes from or how it is characterized. 
The Court should be aware of this distinction. The Appellee's 
will try to confuse the issues by raising issues of waste water and the 
right to control waste water. This case is about the right to use real 
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property to convey water, whatever the source. The case is not 
about water rights. The case is a real property dispute. The 
Stansfields claim no prescriptive right in the water. They claim a 
prescriptive right to use the Green's land for the purposes of 
conveying water. 
The Trial Court erred by granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiffs below. Based on the undisputed facts, the 
Stansfields have a prescriptive easement to use the property of 
Duane Green for purposes of a ditch. The Trial Court should have 
found such and granted Summary Judgment in favor of the 
Stansfields on the issue of a Prescriptive Easement and allowed a 
trial to determine the damages the Stansfields have suffered as a 
result of the Green's intentional interference with the easement. 
II . Title to the property owned by Harold Jensen passed 
to his wife and heirs upon his death in 1951. 
It is undisputed that Harold Jensen was the owner of parcel 
N390-B. It is also undisputed that Melba Jensen was his surviving 
spouse along with three children, all heirs of Harold Jensen. 
A. Utah Statute provides for the automatic passing of land to 
the heirs of the decedent upon the death of the decedent. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 75-3-101, as set forth in the 
Stansfield's Motion to Reconsider before the Trial Court provides in 
pertinent part: "... upon the death of a person, his real and personal 
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property devolves . . . in the absence of testamentary disposition, to 
his heirs. This is an automatic action. The decree of distribution 
entered by a Probate Court is merely the formal written adjudication 
of title. Referring back to common law and the principles of seisen 
provide the basis for this modern principle. It is axiomatic that 
somebody or some entity must continue ownership of real property. 
The State has an interest in collecting taxes on real property from the 
party who owns the property and in seeing that someone is 
responsible for property. If it is true that upon the death of the 
owner the ownership of the real property is held in limbo until a 
formal Probate adjudication there would be a lot of property where 
no responsibility for taxes or ownership would lie. There would also 
be very gaping holes in the chain of title. Neither of these outcomes 
reflects the reality of ownership. The true state of ownership of 
property upon death is that ownership transfers to the heirs 
automatically by operation of statute. 
As explained in 1 Bancroft on Probate, Section 7, which; 
incidentally, was quoted by Plaintiff before the Trial Court, 
"Title vests in the heirs of the decedent immediately 
upon his death, but it so vests "subject to administration" . . . 
The only effect of distribution in probate is to place on record 
the passing of such title as the decedent actually had to his 
heirs. . ." ,1 Bancroft on Probate, Section 7, 15-16(emphasis 
added). 
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Section 101-4-2 of the Revised Statutes of Utah (as amended 
1943) indicates the same thing. "The property, both real and 
personal, of one who dies without disposing of it by will, passes to 
the heirs of the estate. . . " 
It is clear then that the property of the decedent passes upon 
his death. The fact that actual written title is subject to the 
administration of the Courts does not alter that fact. The 
administration provided by the Courts is merely a judicial 
recognition of what has transpired statutorily. Upon Harold's death 
Melba Jensen and other heirs became owners of the property. As 
such, they had the right to preclude others from using the property. 
They couldn't pass good title to the property until a formal 
administration but they had the right to preclude the use of the 
property for a ditch. They didn't do this. The owner's sat on their 
rights and it is too late to object to a Prescriptive Easement which has 
now vested. 
The Probate recognition provides a paper record for that which 
takes place automatically. In fact, as in this case, the paper 
recognition might not take place for quite sometime because it is not 
necessary until an heir of the decedent attempts to pass title to the 
property to a third party. In this case, Melba Jensen didn't instigate 
probate proceedings for almost thirty years after Harold's death. The 
only reason she finally did instigate probate proceedings was to pass 
title to Duane Green. As pointed out earlier, title passed after the 
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Stansfield's Prescriptive Easement vested. Therefore, title was 
passed subject to the easement. More than twenty years had passed 
since Harold Jensen's death and all elements for a prescriptive 
easement were met. 
To find that the heir of a decedent doesn't have any right to 
possession of the property or any control over it until formal title is 
passed through formal probate proceedings would lead to unwanted 
outcomes similar to outcomes which would take place but for the 
Rule Against Perpetuities. The heirs might not instigate probate 
proceedings for a hundred years or more. During that time 
productive users of the property might use it openly, notoriously and 
for the full 100 years. When the heirs finally went to the Probate 
Court for passage of paper title after sitting on their rights for 100 
years they could kick the users off the property. Such an outcome is 
exactly why the courts of equity created the doctrine of Adverse 
Possession and Prescriptive Easements. If the property owners don't 
protect their rights to control the property then the Court shouldn't 
do it for them. 
In the case at bar the property owners didn't protect their 
rights for almost thirty years and now a subsequent purchaser seeks 
to rely on those neglected rights. Equity should not condone such 
reliance. In cases where the requirements for a prescriptive 
easement are met, Courts of equity should support long term uses of 
land to prevent violent disputes over the land. 
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The policy behind recognizing prescriptive rights is well set out 
by Utah case law: 
"The origin and purpose of their [prescriptive rights] 
recognition arises out of the general policy of the law of 
assuring the peace and good order of society by leaving a long 
established status quo at rest rather than by disturbing it. In 
order to serve this purpose, when a claimant has shown that 
such a use has existed peaceably and without interference for 
the prescriptive period of 20 years, [citation omitted] the law 
presumes that the use is adverse to the owner; [citation omitted] 
and that it had a legitimate origin, [citation omitted] The latter 
presumption is usually placed on the ground that there was a 
lawful grant of such right, but that it had been lost. It is 
appreciated that this lost grant theory is fictional. But the 
theory upon which the presumption rests is not important. 
Whatever theory it may be based upon, what is significant is 
that it has a well justified and salutary purpose which is in 
conformity with the policy just discussed; and that is so well 
established in our law that its validity is no longer open to 
question." Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 
1966)(emphasis supplied). 
There are no material issues of fact surrounding the date of 
death of Mr. Jensen. The facts, as established, show that his heirs 
owned the property. The ditch was used in an open and notorious 
manner and for a period of more than twenty years. A Prescriptive 
Easement vested and the Stansfield's Motion for Summary Judgment 
recognizing that fact should have been granted. The Trial Court 
committed error by finding that the prescriptive easement period 
did not begin until 1980 when Melba Jensen probated the estate of 
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Harold Jensen. The case should be reversed and remanded to the 
Trial Court with instructions to grant Summary Judgment for the 
Stansfields. 
I I I . Harold Jensen's grant of permission to use the 
property for a ditch amounts to the grant of an easement 
which was never recorded. 
In the event that the Court determines that Harold Jensen's 
grant of permission flows through subsequent owners and adverse 
use cannot be established in order to claim a prescriptive easement, 
Green's estate is still bound by the easement. Harold Jensen's 
permission would amount to the grant of an easement which was 
never recorded. As pointed out to the Trial Court by counsel for 
Greens, this easement could not be enforced against purchasers who 
took without knowledge. But subsequent purchasers, who take with 
knowledge of the easement, or with sufficient information to put a 
prudent person upon further inquiry, take the newly acquired 
property subject to the prior unrecorded transactions. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 57-1-6, in effect in 1975 when Green purchased 
from Melba Jensen, and since repealed, provided: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument 
of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate 
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as 
notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
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certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in 
the office of the recorder in the county in which such real 
estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding between the 
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification, or record, and as to all other persons who have 
had actual notice . . . " 
This is essentially the same as present Utah Code Annotated 
Section 57-3-2(3) (Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended): 
"This section does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all other 
persons who have notice to the document." 
In Johnson v. BelL 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), the court 
construed Section 57-1-6 and set forth the applicable law as follows: 
"The 'actual notice' required by section 57-1-6 was 
satisfied if a party dealing with the land had information of 
facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry and which, 
if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of 
the title." Johnson v. BelL 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), See 
AlsoToland v. Corev. 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890)(Actual 
information putting the buyer on notice has been recognized by 
Utah Courts for over one hundred years). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Green's familiarity with the area, the 
property, and the fact that the ditch commenced on Howard Miller's 
property and traversed across property being purchased by Green to 
other property belonging to Miller is; at the very least, sufficient 
grounds to require further inquiry by Mr. Green as to the status of 
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the ditch. Mr. Green was a purchaser with notice and is bound by 
the unrecorded easement granted by Harold Jensen. 
Mr. Green was not a naive purchaser. According to Mr. Miller, 
Mr. Green lived in the Goshen area for some 20 or more years prior 
to purchasing the land. Mr. Green was a well known cattle rancher in 
the area and had a very good understanding of the practices 
surrounding irrigation, oral contracts, and water rights in the area. 
From his familiarity it is obvious that he had actual knowledge of the 
ditch in question. 
On a motion for Summary Judgment the Court of Appeals 
should only let the judgment stand when viewing all the facts in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion there is no 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. Aird Insurance Agency v. Zions First National 
Bank. 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). At the very least there is a factual 
question as to Mr. Green's knowledge of the ditch. The Stansfields 
should at least be given the chance to inquire into the actual 
knowledge of the purchaser at the time of purchase. The land in 
question had been used for many years to convey water to what is 
now the Stansfield property. The ditch was maintained over the 
entire period. There also remains a factual question whether Mr. 
Green, as a long time member of the community had knowledge of 
the ditch even prior to the time he purchased the property apart 
from any inspection he made of it at the time of purchasing. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in several respects. There is 
uncontroverted evidence which provides the basis for the 
Stansfields' Prescriptive Easement. The ditch in question was used 
for a period of over forty years when Mr. Green decided he had a 
better use for the water. However, Mr. Green's decision came to late. 
The prescriptive easement in favor of the Stansfields had already 
vested by twenty years continuous, open, notorious and hostile use. 
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by finding the 
ownership of the Jensen property didn't pass to the heirs upon the 
death of Harold Jensen. Ownership of the property transferred 
statutorily to the heirs upon the death of Harold Jensen. The 
property didn't just hang in limbo for almost thirty years until the 
Probate Court established a paper record. 
From the time of Harold Jensen's death until 1971 the use of 
the ditch was adverse to the new owners. In 1971 the easement was 
perfected and should have been recognized by the Trial Court. 
Either the use was adverse as to the owners or at the very least 
there is a question of fact as to whether the use was permissive. 
Either the Stansfields are entitled to Summary Judgment or to a 
remand to determine whether the use was hostile. 
Finally, even if the Court finds that there were no prescriptive 
easement, an unrecorded easement is effective as to Duane Green 
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and his heirs. Duane Green purchased the property with notice. He 
and his estate are subject to the easement in existence at the time of 
purchase 
The appellants ask that the Trial Court be reversed and the 
case be remanded with instruction for the Trial Court to enter 
Summary Judgment for the Stansfields or for further findings of fact 
as to the whether the use was hostile or with instructions for the 
Trial Court to recognize an unrecorded easement in the property as 
to Duane Green's heirs and transferees. 
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STATUTES OF UTAH 
1933 
Published June 17,1933, by 
Authority of an Act of the Legislature 
Effective June 26,1933, at 1:00 o'Clock A. M. 
Together with the Constitution of the United States, 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, the Enabling Act, 
and the Naturalization Laws of the United States. 
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Duty of Legatees for Life Only. 
specific legacies are for life only, the 
itee must sign and deliver to the sec-
ee, or, if there is none, to the personal 
tative, an inventory of the property, ex-
that the same is in his custody for life 
that, on his decease, it is to be deliv-
to remain to the use and for the bene-
le second legatee, or to the personal 
ative, as the case may be. 
(C. L. 17, § 6392.) 
m of Life Estate, 104-59. 
. When Bequest of Income Accrues. 
of a bequest of the interest or income 
;ain sum or fund, the income accrues 
testator's death. (C. L. 17, § 6393.) 
Gifts in Contemplation of Death 
May be Satisfied Before Death. 
y or gift in contemplation, fear or peril 
may be satisfied before death. 
(C. L. 17, § 6394.) 
When Legacies and Annuities Due. 
is are due and deliverable at the expira-
le year after the testator's decease. An-
)mmence at the testator's decease. 
(C. L. 17, § 6395.) 
unentary dispositions vest, 101-2-25. 
n Estate of Sears, 55 P. 83, 18 U. 193. 
Interest on Legacies. 
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Intent Governs Four Preceding 
Sections. 
ur preceding sections are in all cases 
:rolled by a testator's express intention. 
(C. L. 17, § 6397.) 
101-3-18. Executor Cannot Appoint uxecmor. 
An authority to an executor to appoint an 
executor is void. (C. L. 17, § 6399.) 
Kef. 102-3-18. 
101-3-19. Executor Must Qualify—Limited 
Power Before Letters Issue. 
No person has any power as an executor until 
he qualifies, except that before letters have been 
issued he may pay funeral charges and take nec-
essary measures for the preservation of the es-
tate. (C. L. 17, § 6400.) 
101-3-20. Wills Made Prior to May 31, 1884, 
Not Affected. 
The provisions of this title do not impair the 
validity of the execution of any will made prior 
to the 31st day of May, 1884, nor affect the con-
struction of any such will. (C. L. 17, § 6401.) 
101-3-21. When Law of Locus and Law of 
Domicile Governs. 
Except as otherwise provided, the validity and 
interpretation of wills are governed, when re-
lating to real property within this state, by the 
law of this state; when relating to personal 
property, by the law of the testator's domicile. 
(C. L. 17, § 6402.) 
Validity of foreign wills, 101-1-14. 
Proof of foreign wills, 102-3-22. 
In ancillary administration law of domicile governs unless in 
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where domicilary administration is had. Campbell's Estate, 
173 P. 688, 53 U. 487. 
101-3-22. Murderer May Not Inherit From 
Victim. 
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or otherwise, directly or indirectly, by reason of 
the death of such person; but all property of the 
deceased and all rights conditioned upon his 
death shall vest and be determined the same as 
if the person convicted were dead. 
(C. L. 17, § 6403.) 
CHAPTER 4 
SUCCESSION 
101-4-1. Defined. 
Succession is the coming in of another to take 
the property of one who dies without disposing 
of it by will. (C. L. 17, § 6404.) 
29-2-1. 
Title passes to heirs, subject to administration and rights of 
widow and minor children. Snyder v. Murdock, 59 P. 88, 
20 U. 407 ; R. G. W. Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 101 P . 686, 
35 U. 528; Smithfield City, In re., 262 P. 105, 70 U. 564. 
Assignment by heir passes interest after debts and costs of 
administration paid. Dunn v. Wallingford, 155 P. 347, 47 U. 491; 
Stuart v. Pederson, 125 P. 395, 41 U. 308. 
101-4-3. Wife's Interest in Husband's Real 
Property. 
One-third in value of all the legal or equitable 
estates in real property possessed by the hus-
band at any time during the marriage, to which 
the wife has made no relinquishment of her 
rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee 
simple, if she survives him; provided, that the 
wife shall not be entitled to any interest under 
the provisions of this section in any such estate 
of which the husband has made a conveyance 
when the wife, at the time of the conveyance, 
was not and never had been a resident of the ter-
ritory or state of Utah. Property distributed 
under the provisions of this section shall be 
free from all debts of the decedent except those 
secured by liens for work or labor done or ma-
terial furnished exclusively for the improve-
ment of the same, and except those created for 
the purchase thereof, and for taxes levied there-
on. The value of such part of the homestead as 
may be set aside to the widow shall be deducted 
from the distributive share provided for her in 
this section. In case3 wherein only the heirs, de-
visees and legatees of the decedent are interest-
ed, the property secured to the widow by this 
section may be set off by the court in due process 
of administration. (C. L. 17, § 6406.) 
Limited right of married man to devise away from his wife, 
101-1-1. 
Relinquishment by insane wife, 102-13-22 et seq. 
Homesteads, Title 38. 
Value of homestead set aside to widow under 101-4-6 must be 
deducted from her distributive share of real estate falling to 
her under this section; provided estate is solvent and above 
homestead allowance in value. She cannot have both unless such 
design appears clearly from her husband's will. Little 's Estate, 
61 P. 899. 22 U. 204. 
When a widow renounces her husband's will, the law fixes 
what estate she takes by the provisions of, 101-4-5. Little's Es-
tate. 61 1\ 899. 22 U. 204. 
Wife's right not affected by husband's representation tha t he 
is an unmarried man. unless she knowingly permits innocent 
persons to deal with him as such. Hilton v. Sloan, 108 P . 689, 
37 U. 359. 
Wife's right is subject to lien or encumbrance existing before 
her right attaches. Wilson v. Wilson, 89 P. 643, 31 U. 169. 
This section does not confer upon a widow the r ight to take 
the value of her interest out of her husband's es ta te ; her inter-
est is in the nature of an encumbrance on each specific parcel. 
Park 's Estate, 87 P. 900, 31 U. 255. 
Relinquishment of interest. Bell's Estate, 80 P . 615, 29 U. 1 ; 
Palmer v. Palmer, 72 P. 3, 26 U. 31. 
The right to a wife's interest is governed by law in force at 
the death of husband, while measure of interest is determined 
by law in force at time of his conveyance. Hilton v. Thatcher, 
88 P. 20. 31 U. 360. 
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Wife's inchoate interest not superior to lien of renewal mort-
ge securing debt barred by limitations as to wife. Tracy 
>an & Trust Co. v. Luke, 269 P. 780, 72 U. 231. 
This section does not apply where husband's rights under cer-
icate of sale of state lands were conveyed before payment of 
lal installment. McNeil v. McNeil, 211 P. 988, 61 U. 141. 
Wife taking certain property in satis/action ol her statutory 
rht, the heirs were subrogated to her nght in other property 
against plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract 
»de with deceaHed husband without wife's consent. Free v. 
ttle, 88 P. 407, 31 U. 449. 
Widow electing to take her statutory interest takes not as 
ir but in her own right. Staats v. Staats, 226 P. 677. 63 U. 470 ; 
illen's Estate, 151 P. 533, 47 U. 96. 
When the decedent's interest in realty is in partnership real 
tate, hi«i widow takes one-third of his interest. Staats v. 
aats, 226 P. 677, 63 U. 470. 
A conveyance by huuband to wife and members of family Is 
esumptively with her consent, and is a relinquishment of her 
terest. Kjar's K.stute, 220 P. 601, 62 U. 427. 
Wife's interest in husband's property, other than homestead, 
subject to mechanics' lien. Langton Lime & Cement Co. V. 
rry, 159 P. 19, 48 U. 112. 
Cited—Wherritt v. Dennis, 159 P. 534. 48 U. 309; H. T. & 
Co. v. Whit/»house, 154 P. 950, 47 V. 323; Beck v. Utah-
«ho Sugar Co.. 203 P. 647, 59 U. 314. 
heritanee Tax—Taking under the statute property is exempt. 
Bullen's Estate, 151 P. 633, 47 U. 96. 
Electing to take under the will she takes same as any other 
legatee subject to inheritance tax. Osgood's Estate, 
173 P. 162, 52 U. 186; Kohn's Estate, 189 P. 409, 56 U. 17. 
Where husband makes provision by will for his wife, she may 
waive her rights under statute and take under will, nnd 
whatever share she receives under will passes to her by 
such will and not otherwise. Osgood's Estate, 173 2*. 152, 
62 U. 185; Kohn's Estate, 189 P. 409, 56 U. 17. 
H-4-4. Election by Widow to Take Under 
Will or Distributive Share. 
If the husband shall make any provision by 
ill for the widow, such provision shall be deemed 
be in lieu of the distributive share secured 
r the next preceding section, unless it shall ap-
;ar from the will that the decedent designed 
ie testamentary provisions to be additional to 
ich distributive share, in which case the widow 
ia/1 be presumed to have accepted both such 
stamentary provisions and such distributive 
lare. If, however, it does not appear from the 
ill that its provision for the widow is addition-
, then the widow shall be conclusively pre-
med to have renounced such provision and to 
ive accepted her distributive share, unless 
ithin four months after the admission of the 
ill to probate, or within such additional time 
fore distribution as the court may allow, she 
all, by written instrument filed with the clerk 
the court, accept the testamentary provision, 
lich acceptance shall be construed to be a re-
inciation of her distributive share. In the 
ent that the wife shall be insane or incompe-
tit, or absent from the state, an election shall 
made for her by a general guardian, if she 
s one, or by a special guardian for the pur-
se appointed by the court. (C. L. 17, § 6407.) 
/idow renouncing provisions of will in her favor and electing 
:ake her distributive share, when after paying her allowance 
other expenses of administration the net value of the resi-
of the estate was $1,100, could not claim as against the will 
property as homestead under 101-4-6, nor by way of eurn-
•y distribution under 102-8-2. Schenk's restate. 178 P. 844, 
LT. 381. 
enunciation by a widow docs not nullify a will as to other 
uests, nor take from other legatees their rights thereunder, 
.le's Estate, 61 P. 899, 22 U. 204. 
' husband makes provision for wife in will, presumptively 
vas made in lieu of, and not in addition to, her statutory 
re, unless will shows otherwise. Kohn's Estate, 189 P. 409, 
U. 17. 
Right to elect is a property right. Hansen's Guardianship. 247 P. 481, 67 V. 256. 
Devise to widow of income from entire estate during life, held, in lieu of distributive share. Hansen's Guardianship, 247 P. 481, 67 U. 256. 
Election by Widow -When widow incompetent— Election for h«r 
by guardian, by Court, when. Hansen's Guardianship, 
247 V. 4H\, m U. 256. 
Distributi/e share limited to real estate. Hansen's Guardian-
ship. 247 P. 4S1, 67 U. 256. 
Widow tuking on partition in lieu of dower under statute of 
1876. takes in fee. Itockwell v. Hnys, 151 P. 837. 47 U. 14. 
101—4-5. Succession in Absence of Will or 
Marriage Contract. 
When any person having title to any estate, 
not otherwise limited by marriage contract, dies 
without disposing of the estate by will, it is 
succeeded to and must be distributed, unless 
otherwise expressly provided in this title or in 
the probate code, subject to the payment of his 
debts, in the following manner; 
(1) If the decedent leaves a surviving hus-
band or wife, and only one child or the issue of 
one child, in equal shares to the surviving hus-
band or wife, and child or issue of such child; if 
the decedent loaves a surviving husband or wife, 
and more than one child living or one child liv-
ing and the issue of one or more deceased chil-
dren, one-third to the surviving husband or wife, 
and the remainder in equal shares to his chil-
dren, and to the issue of any deceased child by 
r ight of representation; but if there is no child 
of the decedent living at his death, the remain-
der goes to till of his lineal descendants; and if 
all of the descendants are in the same degree 
of kindred to the decedent, they share equally, 
otherwise they take by right of representation. 
The share in the legal and equitable estates in 
real property of which an intestate husband dies 
possessed, secured by this section to his widow, 
shall not be additional to the interest in such 
estate provided for her in section 101-4-3. 
(2) If the decedent leaves no surviving hus-
band or wife, but leaves issue, the whole estate 
goes to such issue, and if such issue consists of 
more than one child living, or one child living 
and the issue of one or more deceased children, 
then the estate goes in equal shares to the chil-
dren living, or to the child living and the issue 
of the deceased child or children by right of rep-
resentation. 
(3) If the decedent leaves no issue, all of the 
estate, real and personal, of which the decedent 
died seised or possessed, of not over $25,000 in 
value exclusive of debts and expenses, goes to 
the surviving husband or wife; and if over that 
value, $25,000 in value thereof goes to the sur-
viving husband or wife, and the excess goes one-
half to the surviving husband or wife and the 
other half to the decedent's father and mother, 
in equal shares, and if either is dead, the whole 
of said half goes to the other; if there is no 
father or mother, then one-half of such excess 
goes in equal shares to the brothers and sisters 
of the decedent, and to the children or grand-
[1123] WILLS AND SUCCESSION 101-4-6 101-4-8 
children of any deceased brother or sister by 
right of representat ion; if the decedent leaves 
no issue or husband or wife, the estate must 
go to his fa ther and mother in equal shares, 
and if either is dead, then to the other. 
(4) If there is neither issue, husband, wife, 
father nor mother, then in equal shares to the 
brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to the 
children or grandchi ldren of any deceased 
brother or s is ter by r ight of representat ion. 
(5) If the decedent leaves a surviving hus-
band or wife, and neither issue, father, mother, 
brother nor sister, nor the children or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister, the 
whole estate goes to the surviving husband or 
wife. 
(6) If the decedent leaves neither issue, hus-
band, wife, father, mother, brother nor sister, 
nor children or grandchildren of any deceased 
brother or sister , the estate must go to 
the next kin in equal degree, excepting tha t 
when there a re two or more collateral kindred 
In equal degree, bu t claiming through different 
ancestors, those who claim through the nearest 
ancestor must be preferred to those claiming 
through an ancestor more remote. 
(7) If the decedent leaves several children, 
or one child and the issue of one or more chil-
dren, and any such surviving child dies under 
age, not having been married, all the estate that 
came to the deceased child by inheritance from 
such decedent descends in equal shares to the 
other children of the same parent, and to the is-
sue of any such other children who are dead, by 
right of representation. 
(8) If at the death of such child who dies 
under age, not having been married, all the other 
children of his parents are also dead, and any 
of them have left issue, the estate that came 
to such child by inheritance from his parents 
descends to the issue of all other children of the 
same parent; and if all the issue are in the same 
degree of kindred to the child, they share the 
estate equally, otherwise they take by right of 
representation. 
(9) If the decedent leaves no husband, wife 
or kindred, and there are no heirs to take the 
estate or any portion thereof, the same shall es-
cheat to the state for the benefit of the school 
fund. (L. 25, p. 195, § 6408:) 
Succession by a witness to a will, 101-1-13. 
Property subject to payment of debts, 101-1-1; 101-3-2, 8 ; 
161-4-2. 
Property not subject to payment of debts, 102-8-2. 
One feloniously causing death may not inherit from victim, 
101-8-22. 
"Not otherwise limited by marriage contract" refers to an an-
tenuptial contract for conveying property or creating an en-
cumbrance thereon,- and not to any contract inhering in the 
relation of husband and wife. Schenk's Estate, 178 P. 844. 
It U. 881. 
Helm failing to claim—Within five years. Apostolopoulos' Es-
tate. 260 P. 469, 68 U. 844; French's Estate. 
228 P. 194, 64 U. 66; 48 A. L. R. 1322. 
Where testator disposed of personal estate by will and widow 
rtnounced, she cannot claim interest in personalty as distributee 
under this section. Little's Estate, 61 P. 899. 22 U. 204. 
Share of property passing to widow over her one-third interest 
granted by 101-4-8 is subject to inheritance tax. Bullen's Estate. 
161 P. 638. 47 U. 96. 
Installments on war-risk policy unpaid at death of beneficiary 
should be distributed to heirs determined by time of death. Slo-
gan's Estate, 297 P. 1007. 77 U. 486. 
Cited—Columbia Trust Co. v. Ar/glum, 226 P. 1089, 63 U. 863. 
Aliens—Condition on right to take by will or by succession may 
be imposed—Escheat after statutory period. Apostolopou-
los' Estate, 250 P. 469, 68 U. 344, 48 A. L. R. 1322. 
101-4-6. Homestead—Exempt Proper ty . 
A homestead as provided by section 1, title 
Homesteads, together with all personal property 
exempt from execution, shall be wholly exempt 
from the payment of the debts of the decedent, 
and shall be the absolute property of the sur-
viving husband or wife and minor children, or 
of the minor children in case there is no surviv-
ing husband or wife, or of the surviving husband 
or wife in case there are no minor children, to 
be set apar t on petition and notice, a t any time 
af ter the r e tu rn of the inventory. 
(C. L. 17, § 6409.) 
Homestead of decedent—Use and distribution, 102-8. 
Exemptions from execution generally, 104-37-13. 
Widow renouncing provisions of will in her favor under 
101-4-4 and electing to take her distributive share, when after 
paying her allowance and other expenses of administration the 
net value of the residue of the estate was $1,100, could not 
claim as against the will all property as homestead under this 
section, nor by way of summary distribution under 102-8-2. 
Schenk's Estate, 178 P. 344, 63 U. 381. 
When homestead is set apart it vests absolutely, and it matters 
not that the property subsequently enhances in value. Bedford's 
Estate, 95 P. 618. 34 U. 2 4 ; 16 L. R. A. ns. 728. See also. 
Christiansen v. Robinson, 99 P. 458, 35 U. 67. 
This section is not in conflict with 102-8-2. Syndergaard's Es-
tate, 88 P. 616, 31 U. 490. 
Court cannot make distribution under this section until ex-
pense of administration has been paid as required by 102-8-2. 
Petersen's Estate, 256 P. 409, 69 U. 4841 Thorn's Estate. 
67 P. 22, 24 U. 209. 
Right to dispose of homestead is limited to estates exceeding 
homestead limit in value. Little's Estate, 61 P. 899, 22 U. 204. 
See also, Schenk's Estate, 178 P. 344, 63 U. 881. 
101-4-7. Id. Ownership—Part i t ion . 
If the surviving husband or wife again mar-
ries, or when all minor children arrive at the 
age of majority, the homestead may be par t i -
tioned, .one-half to the surviving husband or wife 
and the other half to the children. The interest 
of the surviving husband or wife or of any child 
in the homestead may be disposed of by will, 
or shall pass by succession in the proportions 
aforesaid as other real property, but partit ion 
shall not be made except at such times as in th is 
section provided. (C. L. 17, § 6410.) 
Homesteads, Title 38. 
101-4-8. Id. Value Deducted F rom Share of 
Survivor. 
The value of such part of the homestead and 
exempt personal property as may be set aside to 
the surviving wife or husband or minor children 
shall be deducted from the distributive share pro-
vided for such survivors.- (C. L. 17, § 6411.) 
Value of homestead set aside to widow under 101-4-6 must be 
deducted from her distributive share of real estate falling to her 
under 101-4-3; provided, the estate is solvent and above the 
homestead allowance in value. Little's Estate, 61 P. 899, 
22 U. 204. 
101-4-9—101-4-19 WILLS AND SUCCESSION 
101-4-9. Dower and Curtesy Abolished. 
There shall be neither dower nor curtesy in 
this state. (C. L. 17, § 6412.) 
Cited—Hilton v. Thatcher, 88 P. 20. 31 U. 360. 
101-4-10. Il legitimate Children — Inheri tance 
By. 
Every illegitimate child is an heir of the per-
son who acknowledges himself to be the father 
of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his 
mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole 
or in part, as the case may be, in the same man-
ner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. The 
issue of all marr iages null in law, or dissolved 
by divorce, are legitimate. (C. L. 17, § 6413.) 
Legitimation by acknowledgment, 14-4-12. 
Marriage in belief that former spouse was dead or divorced, 
issue legitimate, 40-1-3. 
Bastards—Ability to inherit and transmit property. Rohwer V. 
District Court. 126 P. 671, 41 U. 279. 
Right of Inheritance—Purely statutory and unless given by 
statute does not exist. Mansfield v. Neff, 134 P. 1160, 
43 U. 258. 
Legitimation by acknowledgment gives right of inheritance. 
Garr's Estate, 86 P. 757. 31 U. 57. 24 A. L. It. 570. 
Acknowledgment- Acts held sufficient. Harrison v. Harker, 
142 P. 716, 44 U. 541 ; Rohwer v. District Court, 125 P. 671, 
41 U. 270. 
Acts held insufficient. Quantum of proof and burden of 
proof. Roberts' Estate. 256 P. 1068. 69 U. 548. 
The fruit of marriages that are void under our statute are de-
clared to be legitimate and entitled to all the Iwnefits of children 
born in lawful wedlock. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Com., 
234 P. 697, 65 U. 100. 
101-4-11. Id. Inheri tance From. 
If an illegitimate child dies intestate, without 
leaving husband or wife or lawful issue, his 
estate goes to his mother, or, in case of her 
decease, to her heirs at law. (C. L. 17, § 6414.) 
101-4-12. Degrees of Kindred—How Comput-
ed. 
The degree of kindred is established by the 
number of generations, and each generation is 
called a degree. (C. L. 17, § 6415.) 
101-4-13. Id. Lineal and Collateral. 
The series of degrees forms the line; the 
series of degrees between persons who descend 
from one another is called direct or lineal con-
sanguinity, and the series of degrees between 
persons who do not descend from one another, 
but spring from a common ancestor, is called 
the collateral line or collateral consanguinity. 
(C. L. 17, § 6416.) 
101-4-14. Id. Ascending and Descending. 
The direct line is divided into a direct line 
descending and a direct line ascending. The 
first is that which connects the ancestor with 
those who descend from him. The second is that 
which connects a person with those from whom 
he descends. (C. L. 17, § 6417.) 
101 4-15. Id. In Direct Line. 
In the direct line there are as many degrees as 
there are generations. Thus, the son is, with 
regard to the father, in the first degree; the 
grandson, in the second; and vice versa with 
regard to the father and grandfather toward 
the sons and grandsons . (C. L. 17, § 6418.) 
101-4-16. Id. In Collateral Line. 
In the collateral line the degrees are counted 
by generations from one of the relatives up to 
the common ancestor, and from the common 
ancestor to the other relatives. In such com-
putation the decedent is excluded, the relative 
included, and the ancestor counted but once. 
Thus, brothers are related in the second degree; 
uncle and nephew in the third degree; cousins-
german in the fourth, and so on. 
(C. L. 17, § 6419.) 
101-4-17. Half Blood Inher i t s Equally With 
Whole Blood. 
Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with 
those of the whole blood in the same degree, un-
less the inheritance comes to the intestate by 
descent, devise or gift of some one of his ances-
tors, in which case all those who are not of the 
blood of such ancestor must be excluded from 
such inheri tance. (C. L. 17, § 6420.) 
"Of the blond" includes the half blood nnd excludes only thn#* 
who have none of the blood of the aneentor from whom the es-
tate, comes. Gardner's Estate v. Gardner. 129 P. 360, 42 U. 40. 
101-4 18. Advancements—To be Taken To-
wards Share. 
Any estate, real or personal given by the de-
cedent in his lifetime as an advancement to any 
child, or other lineal descendant, is a part of the 
estate of the decedent for the purposes of divi-
sion and distribution thereof among his issue, 
and must be taken by such child or other lineal 
descendant toward his share of the estate of the 
decedent. (C. L. 17, § 6421.) 
Kffect of Advancement*, 101-1-34 
Advancements not taken as ademptions. 101-2-5. 
Advancements to be specified in decree of distribution. 
102-12-St. 
Advancement—Statutory provisions immaterial when language 
of will covers. Pickard'a Estate, 129 P. 353, 42 U. 106. 
101-4-19. Id. If Exceeding or Less Than 
Share. 
If the amount of such advancement exceeds 
the share of the heir receiving the same, he must 
be excluded from any further portion in the di-
vision and distribution of the estate, but he must 
not be required to refund any part of such ad-
vancement; and, if the amount so received h 
less than his share, he is entitled to so much more 
as will give him his full share of the estate of 
the decedent. (C. L. 17, § 6422.) 
Cited—Pickard'a Estate, 129 P. 353, 42 U. 105. 
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101-4-20—101-4-24 
101-4-20. Id. Defined. 
All gifts and grants are made as advancements, 
if expressed in the gift or grant to be so made, 
or if charged in writ ing by the decedent as an 
advancement, or acknowledged in writing as 
such by the child or other successor or heir. 
(C. L. 17, § 6423.) 
Statutory provisions immaterial when language of will eovera 
Parol evidence admissible in case of ambiguity. Pickard's Es-
tate. 129 P. 353. 42 U. 105. 
101-4-21. Id. Value, How Determined. 
If the value of the estate so advanced is 
expressed in the conveyance, or in the charge 
thereof made by the decedent, or in the 
acknowledgment of the par ty receiving it, it 
must be held as of that value in the division and 
distribution of the es ta te ; otherwise, it must be 
estimated according to its value when given, as 
nearly as the same can be ascertained. 
(C. L. 17, § 6424.) 
101-4-22. Id. Charged Against Issue of De-
ceased Heir . 
If any child, or other lineal descendant, re-
ceiving an advancement dies before the decedent, 
leaving issue, the advancement must be taken 
into consideration in the division and distribu-
tion of the estate, and the amount thereof must 
be allowed accordingly by the representatives 
of the heirs receiving the advancement in the 
same manner as if the advancement had been 
made directly to them. (C. L. 17, § 6425.) 
101-4-23. Inher i tance "By Right of Represen-
ta t ion"—Posthumous Child Deemed 
Alive a t P a r e n t s ' Death . 
Inheritance or succession "by r ight of repre-
sentat ion" takes place when the descendants of 
any deceased heir take the same share or r ight 
in the estate of another person tha t their parents 
would have taken if living. Posthumous chil-
dren are considered as living at the death of 
their parents . (C. L. 17, § 6426.) 
Cited—Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Com.. 193 P. 24, 
57 U. 118. 
An unborn child is an heir, within 104-3-11 giving right of ac-
tion for death for benefit of heirs. Parmley v. Pleasant Valley 
Coal Co.. 228 P. 657. 64 U. 125. 
101-4-24. Aliens May Take by Succession. 
Aliens as well as citizens may in all cases 
take by succession; and no person capable of suc-
ceeding under the provisions of th i s t i t le is pre-
cluded from such succession by reason of the 
alienage of any relat ives. (C. L. 17, § 6427.) 
Validity of foreign wills, 101-1-14. 
Applied: French's Estate. 228 P. 194. 64 U. 66. 
Aliens—State may impose conditions on right to take by will 
or succession. Apostolopouloa' Estate, 250 P. 469, 68 U. 844. 
48 A. L. R. 1322. 
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81-1-1. Contracts to Sell and Sales. 
(1) A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees 
to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called 
the price. 
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rid t h a t now husband may dispose of all 
is es ta te by will subject to homestead 
ghts of widow and minor children, if 
'ife's one-third interest is not in excess 
f homestead allowance, but if one-third 
xceeds the homestead, he may only de-
ise from his widow two-thirds of his 
ealty. 
i. L. It. notes. 
lonstruction, application, and effect of 
s ta tu tes which deny or qualify r igh t 
of widow or surviving husband to 
elect against will of other spouse, 87 
A. L. 11. 228. 
Mrection in will tha t provision for wife 
shall be in lieu of other r igh ts as 
requir ing election, 93 A. L. R. 1384. 
effect of election to take under will on 
r igh t of widow to fixed s t a tu to ry 
allowance, or allowance for suppor t , 
4 A. L. R. 391. 
Estate tax as element in computat ion of 
widow's share in estate , 10 A. L. R. 
518. 
aoverning law as to r ights of spouse in 
es ta te of deceased spouse, 88 A. L. 
R. 861. 
Provision in will directing conversion as 
affecting r ights of surviving spouse 
tak ing for or agains t will, 91 A. L. 
R. 807. 
denunciation of will by spouse and 
election to take under s t a tu te as af-
fecting provisions imposing upon 
spouse personal duty as t rus tee , 
executor, guardian, or the like, 71 
A. L. R. G(55. 
101-4-5. Succession in Absence of Will or Marriage Contract. 
When any person having title to any estate, not otherwise limited by 
marriage contract, dies without disposing of the estate by will, it is 
succeeded to and must be distributed, unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this title or in the probate code, subject to the payment of his 
debts, in the following manner: 
(1) If the decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife, and only one 
child or the issue of one child, in equal shares to the surviving hus-
band or wife, and child or issue of such child; if the decedent leaves a 
surviving husband or wife, and more than one child living or one child 
living and the issue of one or more deceased children, one-third to the 
surviving husband or wife, and the remainder in equal shares to his 
children, and to the issue of any deceased child by right of representa-
tion; but if there is no child of the decedent living at his death, the 
remainder goes to all of his lineal descendants; and if all of the descend-
ants are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent, they share 
equally, otherwise they take by right of representation. The share in 
the legal and equitable estates in real property of which an intestate 
husband dies possessed, secured by this section to his widow, shall not 
be additional to the interest in such estate provided for her in section 
101-4-3. 
Revocation of election to take under or 
cont ra ry to will, 81 A. L. R. 740. 
T rea tmen t of widow's allowance and 
exemptions in computing share to 
which she is enti t led in case of 
death of husband in tes ta te or of 
her election to take aga ins t will, 
98 A. L. R. 1325. 
W h a t amounts to election by widow to 
take under or aga ins t will, 82 A. 
L. R. 1509. 
W h a t amounts to widow's election as 
between antenupt ia l or postnuptial 
set t lement and husband ' s will or 
her r igh t s under s t a tu te of descent 
and dis tr ibut ion, or a t tack by her 
upon such sett lement, 117 A. L. R. 
1001. 
When is widow put to her election be-
tween provision made for her by 
her husband 's will, and her dower, 
homestead, or community r ight , 68 
A. L. R. 507. 
Widow's allowance and exemptions, 
t r ea tmen t of in computing share to 
which she is entitled under s ta tu te 
of distr ibution in case of death of 
husband intes ta te or of her election 
to take aga ins t will, 98 A. L. R, 
1325. 
Widow's s t a tu to ry dis tr ibut ive share as 
affected by advancements to others, 
or by provisions of will t h a t legatees 
shall take certain indebtedness 
owing to tes ta tor as pa r t of their 
share , 70 A. L. R. 1420. 
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(2) If the decedent leaves no surviving husband or wife, but leaves 
issue, the whole estate goes to such issue, and if such issue consists of 
more than one child living, or one child living and the issue of one or 
more deceased children, then the estate goes in equal shares to the chil-
dren living, or to the child living and the issue of the deceased child or 
children by right of representation. 
(3) If the decedent leaves no issue, all of the estate, real and per-
sonal, of which the decedent died seised or possessed, of not over $25,000 
in value exclusive of debts and expenses, goes to the surviving husband 
or wife; and if over that value, $25,000 in value thereof goes to the sur-
viving husband or wife, and the excess goes one-half to the surviving 
husband or wife and the other half to the decedent's father and mother, 
in equal shares, and if either is dead, the whole of said half goes to the 
other; if there is no father or mother, then one-half of such excess 
goes in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to 
the children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by right 
of representation; if the decedent leaves no issue or husband or wife, the 
estate must go to his father and mother in equal shares, and if either 
is dead, then to the other. 
(4) If there is neither issue, husband, wife, father nor mother, then 
in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to the 
children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by right of 
representation. 
(5) If the decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife, and neither 
issue, father, mother, brother nor sister, nor the children or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister, the whole estate goes to the 
surviving husband or wife. 
(6) If the decedent leaves neither issue, husband, wife, father, 
mother, brother nor sister, nor children or grandchildren of any de-
ceased brother or sister, the estate must go to the next kin in equal 
degree, excepting that when there are two or more collateral kindred 
in equal degree, but claiming through different ancestors, those who 
claim through the nearest ancestor must be preferred to those claiming 
through an ancestor more remote. 
(7) If the decedent leaves several children, or one child and the issue 
of one or more children, and any such surviving child dies under age, 
not having been married, all the estate that came to the deceased child 
by inheritance from such decedent descends in equal shares to the other 
children of the same parent, and to the issue of any such other children 
who are dead, by right of representation. 
(8) If at the death of such child who dies under age, not having been 
married, all the other children of his parents are also dead, and any 
of them have left issue, the estate that came to such child by inheritance 
from his parents descends to the issue of all other children of the same 
parent ; and if all the issue are in the same degree of kindred to the 
child, they share the estate equally, otherwise they take by right of 
representation. 
(9) If the decedent leaves no husband, wife or kindred, and there are 
no heirs to take the estate or any portion thereof, the same shall es-
cheat to the state for the benefit of the school fund. 
(L. 25, p. 195, § 6408.) 
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History. 
This section originally was contained 
in sections 703 to 713 of Comp. Laws 
1876. It was more or less identical 
with Comp. Laws 1888, § 2741, except 
for the last sentence of subdivision (1), 
and subdivision (3). In R. S. 1898, 
§ 2828 the last sentence of subdivision 
(1) was added as a proviso, and sub-
division (3) assumed its present form 
except that $25,000 formerly read "five 
thousand dollars." And both the Re-
vised Statutes of 1898, supra, and Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 2828, are practically iden-
tical with the present section. 
Formerly under ^subdivision (3), if 
intestate died without issue leaving a 
widow and brother, each took one-half 
of the estate. Benson v. Anderson, 10 
U. 135, 138, 37 P. 25G, applying 2 Comp. 
Laws 1888, § 2741, subd. 2, from which 
present subdivision is derived. 
Cross-references. 
Succession by a witness to a will, 
101-1-13; property subject to payment 
of debts, 101-1-1, 101-3-2, 101-3-3, 101-
4-2; property not subject to payment of 
debts, 102-8-2; one feloniously causing 
death may not inherit from victim, 101-
3-22. 
1. Validity. 
A subdivision of the statute of de-
scents in the Territorial Act, similar to 
subdivision (1), whereby the widow took 
a child's part during her life or widow-
hood, which became the property of her 
children at her death, was held valid. 
Cain's Heirs v. Young, 1 U. 3(51, rev'd 
on another point 99 U. S. 610, 25 L. 
Ed. 421. 
2. Words and phrases defined. 
The words "limited by marriage con-
tract" refer to antenuptial contract for 
conveying property or creating an en-
cumbrance thereon; not to any contract 
inhering in the relation of husband and 
wife. In re Schenk's Estate, 53 U. 381, 
178 P. 344. This case is reviewed supra, 
101-4-4. 
3. Surviving husband or wife with chil-
dren or issue. 
Under former legislation, if widow 
agreed to receive property in lieu of her 
statutory interest, and, after approval 
by commissioner appointed to make 
partition, his report is confirmed by 
decree of distribution, the widow takes 
such property in fee, and, therefore, her 
grantee would take the same title free 
from claims of heirs. Shaw v. Hays, 
47 U. 14, 151 P. 337, applying Comp. 
Laws 1876, § 703, which is considerably 
like present section. 
Under subdivision (1) of this section, 
the widow takes as heir of her husband, 
and not in her own right. That is, 
what goes to her under that subdivision, 
over and above her one-third interest 
granted under 101-4-3, she takes as 
her husband's heir, for the reason that 
he may dispose of it by will to her or to 
another. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 U. 
96, 151 P. 533, L. R. A. 1916 C 670. 
Under territorial law of descent, "her 
estate" went one-fourth to her surviving 
husband for life, and the remainder, with 
the other three-fourths, to her surviving 
children. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 U. 116, 
129, 148 P. 1096. 
1. Issue, but no surviving husband or 
wife. 
"Issue" as used in subdivision (2) of 
this section does not include adopted 
children so as to allow them to inherit 
through their adoptive parents. In re 
Harrington's Estate, 96 U. '252, 85 P.2d 
630, 120 A. L. R. 830. 
5. Surviving husband or wife, but no 
issue. 
Under subdivision (3) unpaid monthly 
instalments on war-risk policy, unpaid 
at death of beneficiary, are to be dis-
tributed to heirs of insured, who were 
such at time of insured's death. In re 
Hogan's Estate, 77 U. 486, 491, 297 P. 
1007. 
6. Inheritance by brothers and sisters. 
Statutory provisions, under which 
brothers and sisters may inherit, are to 
be construed with reference to statutory 
provision precluding kindred of half 
blood from inheriting property descend-
ing from ancestor of decedent. Matter 
of Estate of Amy, 12 U. 278, 42 P. 1121, 
afFd 171 U. S. 179, 43 L. Ed. 127, 18 
S. Ct. 802. 
7. Escheat to school fund. 
Right to take by succession is not 
absolute and unknown heirs not appear-
ing within five years may lose rights 
under 102-12-28, providing for escheat 
alter expiration of such period if no 
claimants appear. In re Apostolopoulos' 
Estate, 68 U. 344, 250 P. 469, 253 P. 
1117, 48 A. L. R. 1322. 
In view of this provision and 102-12-
28, unclaimed estate escheats after five 
years notwithstanding existence of heirs 
unaware of their rights, where notice 
by publication is given under 102-12-7. 
(But this may be modified by provisions 
of treaty between United States and 
country of an alien intestate, requiring 
actual notice to consular authorities 
respecting death of any such person 
without apparent heirs.) In re Apostolo-
poulos' Estate, 68 U. 344, 250 P. 469, 253 
P. 1117, 48 A. L. R. 1322. 
Further as to escheat, see 102-12-28 
to 102-12-30. 
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8. Renunciation of will. 
Where widow renounces will whereby 
her deceased husband disposed of his 
personal property, she cannot claim 
interest in such property as distributee 
under this section. In re Little, 22 U. 
204, 61 P. 899. (Bartch, C. J., dissent-
ing.) 
9. Inheritance tax. 
Even prior to the amendment of the 
Inheritance Tax Act, property which 
passed to the wife by virtue of sub-
division (1) of this section was subject 
to the tax, because the wife takes as heir 
thereunder. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 
U. 96, 151 P. 533, L. R. A. 1916 C 670. 
A. L. R. notes. 
Estate tax as element in computation 
of widow's share in estate, 10 A. 
L. R. 518. 
Estoppel to claim rights in estate of 
deceased spouse by assent or 
failure to object to unlawful mar-
riage with third person, 28 A. L. 
R. 1126. 
Governing law as to rights of spouse 
in estate of deceased spouse, 88 
A. L. R. 861. 
Misconduct of surviving spouse as affect-
ing marital rights in other's estate, 
71 A. L. R. 277. 
History. 
This section was formerly section 676 
of Comp. Laws of 1876. Down to a 
former proviso contained therein it is 
practically identical with R. S. 1898, 
§ 2829 and with Comp. Laws 1907, 
§ 2829. That proviso is now contained 
in 38-0-1 and in Title 52. 
For a discussion of the last sentence 
of R. S. 1898 and of Comp. Laws 1907, 
which was eliminated from this section, 
see post, this note, regarding rule in 
Schenk^s case. 
Cross-references. 
Homesteads, Title 38; use and dis-
tribution of, 102-8; exemptions from 
execution generally, 104-37-13. 
1. Validity. 
Constitutional provision setting up 
equality of rights of ownership of sepa-
.Real property in other state, or its 
value, as a factor in computation of 
the interest of husband or wife in 
other's estate, 66 A. L. R. 733. 
Remarriage as affecting one's status as 
a "widow" or "widower" for pur-
poses of statute of descent and dis-
tribution or other statute employing 
such term, 72 A. L. R. 1324. 
Right of surviving spouse to exoneration 
out of the decedent's estate in re-
spect of liens on estate by entirety, 
67 A. L. R. 1181. 
Separation agreement between husband 
and wife as affecting right of in-
heritance, 81 A. L. R. 693. 
Treatment of widow's allowance and ex-
emptions in computing share to 
which she is entitled in case of 
death of husband intestate or of 
her election to take against will, 98 
A. L. R. 1325. 
Validity of postnuptial agreement re-
leasing or waiving rights of sur-
viving spouse on death of other 
spouse, 49 A. L. R. 116. 
Widow's allowance and exemptions, 
treatment of in computing share to 
which she is entitled under statute 
of distribution in case of death of 
husband intestate or of her election 
to take against will, 98 A. L. R. 
1325. 
rate property by married woman, and 
eliminating the common-law incapacity, 
does not confer rights upon wives differ-
ent from those of husbands, and does 
not invalidate statute giving husband 
homestead in property of deceased wife. 
In re Petersen's Estate, 97 U. 324, 93 
P.2d 445. 
2. General construction. 
This section and 102-8-1, 102-8-2 and 
102-9-21 must be construed together. 
In re Mower's Estate, 93 U. 390, 73 P.2d 
967. It is not in conflict with 102-
8-2, and was not repealed thereby. In 
re Syndergaard's Estate, 31 U. 490, 88 
P. 616. Accordingly, funeral and ad-
ministrative expenses are prior to 
exemptions provided in 104-37-13. In 
re Petersen's Estate, 69 U. 484, 256 P. 
409. 
101-4-6. Homestead—Exempt Property. 
A homestead as provided by section 1, title Homesteads, together with 
all personal property exempt from execution, shall be wholly exempt 
from the payment of the debts of the decedent, and shall be the absolute 
property of the surviving husband or wife and minor children, or 
of the minor children in case there is no surviving husband or wife, or 
of the surviving husband or wife in case there are no minor children, to 
be set apart on petition and notice, at any time after the return of the 
inventory. (C. L. 17, § 6409.) 
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set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on thti 
ground that their counsel had an already: 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law o* 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re* 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Harn^ 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court raa 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg* 
ment, rather than from the date of judgment, 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d))j 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. ?«• 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utafe 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S.— 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.34 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. ' 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, Counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
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pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-6 
create a joint tenancy in himself and another or others by making a trans-
fer to himself and such other or others as joint tenants by use of such 
words as herein provided or by conveying to another person or persons an 
interest in land in which an interest is retained by the grantor and by 
declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use of such words as herein 
provided. In all cases the interest of joint tenants must be equal and 
undivided. 
History: B. S. 1898 & C. I* 1907, § 1973; 
C. L. 1917, §4873; R. 8. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-5; L. 1953, ch, 93, §1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The words "or devised" and "or devise" 
after "granted" and "grant" were deleted 
in R. S. 1933. 
The 1953 amendment added the second, 
third and fourth sentences. 
Cross-References. 
Devise to several vests as owners in 
common, 74-2-34. 
Inheritance tax on jointly held property, 
59-12-5. 
Interparty agreements, 15-3-1 et seq. 
General construction. 
This section expresses the trend away 
from the English joint tenancy and in 
favor of tenancy in common. Neill v. 
Royce, 101 U. 181, 120 P. 2d 327. 
Joint tenancies. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
has said that it would assume that <rptah 
accepts the general common-law rules re-
lating to joint tenancies, including the 
rules permitting alienation of the interest 
of a joint tenant, and making its property 
subject to execution and separate sale." 
Mangus v. Miller, 317 U. S. 178, 87 L. Ed. 
169, 63 S. Ct. 182, reversing 125 F. 2d 507; 
reh. den. 317 U. S. 712, 87 L. Ed. 567, 63 
S. Ct. 432. 
CoUateral References. 
Tenancy in Common<§=>3 
86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 7. 
Creation of tenancy in common, 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d 119, Cotenancy and Joint Owner-
ship §27. 
Creation of right of survivorship by in-
strument ineffective to create estate by 
entireties or joint tenancy, 1 A. L. R. 2d 
247. 
Presumption and proof as to shares of 
respective grantees or transferees in con-
veyance or transfer to two or more per-
sons as tenants in common, silent in that 
regard, 156 A. L. R. 515. 
Use of word "joint" or "jointly" in pro-
vision of deed other than the granting or 
habendum clause as indicating intention 
to create a joint tenancy rather than one 
in common between the grantees, 157 A. 
L. E. 566. 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice—Operation and effect— 
Interest of person not named in instrument.—Every conveyance of real 
estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to 
convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but shall be 
valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowl-
edgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have had 
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein 
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee 
in such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the 
terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of 
the interest of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of 
the grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all 
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claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as 
herein provided setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the 
interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest. 
History: B. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1975; 
C. L. 1917, §4875; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-6; L. 1945, en. 106, § 1 ; 1947, ch. 97, 
§1-
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1945 amendment added the second 
sentence. 
The 1947 amendment inserted "or of the 
grantor or grantors" and substituted "of 
all claims * * * the interest claimed" for 
"of equitable claims unless an instrument 
is executed and recorded as herein pro-
vided, set t ing forth the names of the 
beneficiaries, specifying the beneficial or 
equitable interest held" in the second sen-
tence. 
Cross-Beferences. 
Acknowledgments generally, 57-2-1 et 
seq. 
Certified copies of record of conveyance, 
admission in evidence, 78-25-13. 
County recorder, 17-21-1 et seq. 
Fees of recorder, 21-2-3. 
Judgments , record of as imparting no-
tice, 17-21-11. 
Recording generally, 57-3-1 et seq. 
Transmit t ing documents by telegraph or 
telephone, 69-1-2. 
Acknowledgments. 
A deed as between the parties and those 
having notice thereof is good without any 
acknowledgment, and actual possession 
constitutes notice. Jordan v. Utah R. Co., 
47 U. 519, 156 P . 939. 
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee 
himself as notary public is void; and mort-
gage, though recorded, is ineffective for 
purpose of notice, since i t is not legally 
recordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 U. 524, 
251 P . 29. See 57-2-1 et seq. 
A deed need not be acknowledged to be 
valid between the part ies thereto. Mitch-
ell v. Palmer, 121 U. 245, 240 P . 2d 970. 
Actual notice. 
The demands of this section are an-
swered if a par ty dealing with the land 
has information of a fact or facts tha t 
would put a prudent man upon inquiry 
and would, if pursued, lead to actual 
knowledge of the state of the t i t le ; this 
is actual notice. Toland v. Corey, 6 U. 
392, 24 P . 190, affd. in 154 U. S. 499, 38 
L. Ed. 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144, distinguished 
in 53 U. 468, 173 P . 948. 
Actual occupancy is enough to put par-
ties dealing with the premises upon in-
quiry. Toland v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 24 P . 
190, affd. in 154 U. S. 499, 38 L. Ed. 1062, 
14 S. Ct. 1144, distinguished in 53 U. 468, 
173 P . 948. 
Under this section actual possession and 
occupancy amounts to "actual notice" to 
all the world of grantee's rights even if 
his deed is not recorded. Neponset Land 
& Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 U. 334, 37 
P . 573. 
Attaching creditors who had actual no-
tice of assignment for benefit of creditors 
were not in position to object that statu-
tory notice of assignment was not given. 
Snyder v. Murdock, 20 U. 407, 59 P. 88. 
Where vendee purchased realty from 
one who had bought i t a t an execution 
sale and the record shows the considera-
tion given a t the sale was grossly inade-
quate, the levy excessive and no return 
made by the sheriff of any at tempt to levy 
on personal property, the vendee would not 
be justified in failing to make a reasonable 
inquiry into the validity of the sale and 
if he did not make such inquiry, he would 
not be a bona fide purchaser for value. 
Pender v. Dowse, 1 U. (2d) 283, 265 P . 2d 
644, 42 A. L. R. 2d 1078. 
Even though auditor 's tax deed and 
county tax deed were not acknowledged, 
ti t le technically need not pass to protect 
a tax t i t le claimant, and also the deed is 
binding as to defendant who had actual 
notice because of the claimant's occupancy 
of the property. Peterson v. Callister, 6* 
U. (2d) 359, 313 P . 2d 814, affd. 8 U. (2d) 
348, 334 P . 2d 759. 
In action to cancel recorded one-page 
warranty deed on grounds of mistake, trial 
court properly granted purchasers' motion 
for summary judgment on counterclaim to 
quiet t i t le where circumstances constitut-
ing alleged mistake were not pleaded with 
part iculari ty; there was no allegation of 
any conduct by purchasers preventing 
grantors from ascertaining contents of 
deed; and purchasers had been in actual 
possession of property in question during 
entire period of 21 years since convey-
ance. McKellar v. McKellar, 23 U. (2d) 
106, 458 P . 2d 867. 
Delivery of deed. 
Deed duly executed and acknowledged 
and shown to be in possession of grantee 
is self-proving both as to execution and 
delivery, and recording of deed is likewise 
evidence of delivery. Chamberlain v. Lar-
sen, 83 U. 420, 29 P . 2d 355. 
Inference of delivery arising from pos-
session of deed by grantee and from re-
cording thereof is entitled to great and 
controlling weight and can only be over-
come by clear and convincing evidence. 
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Number, if applicable" below the signature 
line in the form; and added the final para-
graph. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Personal knowledge not required. 
The statutory form does not require the cer-
tificate to state affirmatively that the person 
making the acknowledgment is personally 
known to the officer taking the acknowledg-
ment. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 
766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (applying 
former § 57-2-7). 
CHAPTER 3 
RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
Section 
57-3-1. 
57-3-2. 
57-3-3. 
Certificate of acknowledgment, proof 
of execution, jurat, or other certifi-
cate required — Notarial acts af-
fecting real property. 
Record imparts notice — Change in 
interest rate — Validity of docu-
ment — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Section 
57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record in 
another county — Effect. 
57-3-5 to 57-3-9. Repealed. 
57-3-10. Legal description of real property 
and names and addresses required 
in documents. 
57-3-11. Original documents required — Cap-
tions — Legibility. 
57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of execution, 
jurat, or other certificate required — Notarial 
acts affecting real property. 
(1) A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of 
the execution of any document, or a jurat as defined in Section 46-1-2, or other 
notarial certificate containing the words "subscribed and sworn" or their sub-
stantial equivalent, that is signed and certified by the officer taking the ac-
knowledgment, proof, or jurat, as provided in this title, entitles the document 
and the certificate to be recorded in the offifce of the recorder of the county 
where the real property is located. 
(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this state shall also be performed 
in conformance with Chapter 1, Title 46. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999; 
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-1; L. 1988, ch. 155, § 13; 1989, ch. 88, 
§ 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1988, substituted "docu-
ment" for "conveyance" throughout the section 
and made stylistic changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective July 1,1989, 
inserted the subsection designation (1) at the 
beginning of the section; added "or a jurat as 
defined in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial cer-
tificate containing the words 'subscribed and 
sworn' or their substantial equivalent" and 
"proof, or jurat" in Subsection (1); and added 
Subsection (2). 
Cross-References. — Documents sent by 
telegraph or telephone may be recorded, 
§ 69-1-2. 
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Disqualification of office taking acknowl-
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. edgment 
Disqualification of office taking acknowledg-
 3
 U
 acknowledgment is taken before officer 
m e n t . disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual. 
Cited. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. (1931). 
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee
 C i t e d m Q ^ ^ G l a g s ^ v M a s t ^ ^ 
! S ^ ^ S S 3 ^ ^ c° *766 "*< 2 9 ^ * ^ » » • 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments C.J.S. — 1A C J.S. Acknowledgments § 8. 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment *» 1-4. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 77. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate — 
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing state-
ment complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000; ment designated the existing language as Sub-
C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, section (1) and divided the formerly undivided 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, language into two sentences; in Subsection (1), 
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14; 1989, ch. 88, § 8. deleted "the provisions of' before "Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- 70A-9-402" in the first sentence and made 
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I 
Family settlement of intestate estate, 
29 A. L. R. 3d 174. 
Family settlement of testator's estate, 
29 A. L. R. 3d 8. 
* Form and sufficiency of allegations of 
ieirship, HO A. L. R. 1329. 
Inheritable quality of possibility of re-
verter, 77 A. L. R. 344. 
Mistake as to one's interest in land un-
der law of descent a subject of relief, 39 
A. L. R. 1^4. 
Release to ancestor by heir expectant, 
28 A. L. R. 427. 
Renunciation of benefit under statute 
,f descent and distribution, 170 A. L. R. 
435. 
Right of adopted child to inherit from 
kindred of adoptive parent, 43 A. L. R. 
2d 1183. 
Right of children of adopted child to 
inherit from adopting parent, 94 A. L. 1 
2d 1200. 
Right of children of an adopted child 
to take the share which the parent would 
have taken under a will if he had sur-
vived the testator, 8 A. L. R. 1012. 
Right of heir, next of kin, or other 
person interested in decedent's estate to 
attack his marriage on ground of his 
mental incompetency, 57 A. L. R. 131. 
Succession to property as affected by 
death in common disaster in absence of 
presumption or proof of survivorship, 43 
k. L. R. 1348. 
Validity and effect of transfer of ex-
pectancy by prospective heir, 121 A. 1 i. 
R. 450. 
Law Reviews. 
Intestate Succession and Adoption in 
Utah: A Need for Legislation, 1969 Utah 
L. Rev, 56. 
DECISIONS )ER FORMER LAW 
1 i pi men I of interest by heir. 
Under f o r m e r p r o b a t e code, h e i r 
could assign or dispose of his interest 
in the estate at any time and to any 
person without consent of administrator, 
provided he did so for a good and legal 
consideration; it would be implied, how-
ever, that assignment related only to 
what the heir would have after debts 
and legal expenses of administration 
were paid. Dunn v. Wallingford, 47 U. 
491, 155 P. 347; Stuart v. Pederson, 41 
U. 308, 125 P. 395. 
Escheat 
Right to take by succession was\ not 
absolute but could be qualified or made 
conditional by statute; where unknown 
heirs failed to claim within five years, 
rights were terminated and estate es-
cheated. In re Apostolopoulos' Estate, 
68 U. 344, 250 P. 469, 253 P. 1117, 48 
A. L. R. 1322. 
Family settlements of intestates eii 
tates. 
The law looked with favor upon fam-
ily settlements, and a decree of distri-
bution by a probate court could not be 
attacked collaterally in a suit to quiet 
title to real estate by persons who had 
entered into family settlement. Thomas 
v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 U. (2d) 57, 305 P. 
2d 507. 
Rights of heirs. 
Upon death of intestate, lot upon 
which a house was "built by aamims-
trators without authority descended to 
his heirs, subject to payment of debts 
of deceased. Ralfson v. Cannon,. 3 U 
232, 2 P. 205. 
Homestead passed to heirs subject to 
widow's rights, where estate was sol-
vent and there were no creditors. Knud-
sen v. Hannberg, 8 U. 203, 30 P. 749. 
At death, under former probate code, 
title to property of which deceased died 
possessed immediately passed to and 
vested in heirs, subject to administration 
and payment of debts. Snyder v. Mur-
dock, 20 U. 407, 59 P. 88; In re Smith-
field City, 70 U. 564, 262 P. 105; Cham-
berlain v. Larsen, 83 U. 420, 29 P. 2d 
355; Jones v. State Tax Comm., 99 U. 
373,104 P. 2d 210. 
An heir under former probate code 
took subject only to the legal claims 
against the estate. Dunn v. Wallingford, 
47/11. 491, 155 P. 347. 
Statutory construction. 
Statute providing t h a t i n t e s t a t e ' s 
property passed to heirs, subject to con-
trol of court and administration, was to 
be read in connection with statute pro-
viding for summary administration and 
distribution of small estates. Rands v. 
Brain, 5 U. 197, 14 P. 129. 
Statutory definition of "succession" 
implied that property acquired by suc-
cession could be disposed of by will. In 
re Bullen's Estate, 47 U. 96, 151 P. 533f 
L. R. A. 1916C, 670. 
75-2-102. Share of the spouse.—(1) The intestate share of the 
surviving spouse is: 
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(a) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the 
entire intestate estate; 
(b) If there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by 
a parent or parents, the first $100,000, plus one-half of the balance of 
the intestate estate; 
(c) If there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the sur-
viving spouse also, the first $50,000, plus one-half of the balance of the 
intestate estate; 
(d) If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue 
of the surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate. 
History: C 1953, 75-2-102, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
Editorial Board Comment. 
This section gives the surviving spouse 
a larger share than most existing stat-
utes on descent and distribution. In doing 
so, it reflects the desires of most married 
persons, who almost always leave all of 
a moderate estate or at least one-half 
of a larger estate to the surviving spouse 
when a will is executed. A husband or 
wife who desires to leave the surviving 
spouse less than the share provided by 
this section may do so by executing a 
will, subject of course to possible election 
by the surviving spouse to take an 
elective share of one-third under Par t 2 
of this chapter. Moreover, in the small 
estate (less than $50,000 after home-
stead allowance, exempt property, and 
allowances) the surviving spouse is 
given the entire estate if there are only 
children who are issue of both the dece-
dent and the surviving spouse; the re-
sult is to avoid protective proceedings 
as to property^ otherwise passing to 
their minor children. 
See section 75-2-803 for the definition 
of spouse which controls for purposes 
of intestate succession. 
Cross-References. i 
Creditors' claims, 75-3-801. 
Family allowance, 75-2-403. 
Felon causing death may not inherit 
from victim, 75-2-804. 
Homestead allowance, 75-2-401. 
Succession by witness to will, 75-2-505. 
Surviving spouse, 75-2-803. 
Collateral References. 
Descent and Distribution@=*52(2). 
26A CJ.S. Descent and Distribution 
§49. 
23 Am. Jur. 2d 851, Descent and Dis-
tribution § 108. 
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic Serv-
ice, Uniform Probate Code. 
Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to 
support on part of surviving spouse as 
affecting marital rights in deceased 
spouse's estate, 13 A. L. R. 3d 446. 
Adultery on part of surviving spouse 
as affecting marital rights in deceased 
spouse's estate, 13 A. L. R. 3d 486. 
Computation of the value of an incho-
ate dower right, 64 A. L. R. 1053. 
Constitutionality of statutes in rela-
tion to dower, 20 A. L. R. 1330. 
Construction, application, and effect 
of statute providing for descent of prop-
erty of surviving spouse which had 
been derived from predeceased spouse, 
49 A. L. R. 2d 391. 
Dower as affected by adverse posses-
sion, 41 A. L. R. 1115. 
Dower in permanent leaseholds, 39 
A. L. R. 340. 
Dower in reversion or remainder inter-
est of husband, 21 A. L. R. 1073. 
Dower of alien widow in estate of de-
ceased husband, 110 A. L. R. 520. 
Dower or curtesy in estates of inheri-
tance subject to condition, defeasance, 
termination, or expiration, 25 A. L. R. 
2d 333. 
Dower or curtesy in property subject 
a t time of marriage to contract for dis-
position by sale or will, 8 A. L. R. 3d 
569. 
Dower rights as affected by divorce in 
another state or country, 168 A. L. R. 
793. 
Dower rights in respect of land con-
veyed by husband prior to the marriage 
in fraud of creditors, 110 A. L. R. 985. 
Dower rights of wife in respect of im-
provements made by spouse's alienee or 
his successor after death of spouse, 74 
A. L. R. 1168. 
Dower rights of wife of purchaser un-
der, executory contract, 66 A. L. R. 65. 
Dower rights of wife who unites with 
husband in mortgage, 65 A. L. R. 963. 
Estate tax as element in computation 
of widow's share in estate, 10 A. L. R. 
518. 
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Section 
75-3-1005. Limitations on proceedings 
against personal representa-
tive. 
75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and pro-
ceedings against distributees. 
75-3-1007 Certificate discharging liens'se-
curing fiduciary performance. 
75-3-1008. Subsequent administration 
Part 11 
Compi omise of Controversies 
75-3-1101. Effect of approval of agree-
ments involving trusts, in-
alienable interests, or inter-
ests of third persons. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-101, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment - In its 
present form, this section will not fit existing 
concepts concerning community property in all 
states recognizing community ownership. 
States differ in respect to how much testamen-
tary power a decedent has over the community. 
Also, some changes of language may be neces-
sary to reflect differing views concerning what 
estate is subject to "separate" and "commu-
Devi>* 
Cited 
Devise in fee. 
Where second paragraph of an ambiguous 
will gave residue of estate to son and daughter 
Section 
75-3-1102. Procedure for securing ex.. 
proval of compromise. 
Part 12 
oilection of Personal Property by 
Affidavit and Summary Admin-
istration Procedure 
for Small Estates 
75-3-1201 Collection of personal property 
by affidavit. 
75-3-1202. Effect of affidavit. 
75-3-1203 Small estates — Summary ad-
ministrative procedure. 
75-3-1204 Small estates — Closing by 
sworn statement of personal 
representative. 
nity" debts,, The reference to certain family 
rights is not intended to suggest that such 
rights relate to the survivor's interest in any 
community property. Rather, the assumption 
is thai such rights relate only to property pass-
ing from the decedent at his death; e.g., his 
half of community property and his separate 
property. 
Cross-References. • Successors rights if 
no administration, § 75-3 901 
in equal undivided shares, share and share 
alike, and subsequent paragraphs provided 
that on deaths of daughter and son the shares 
devised to them should go to nephew, the lan-
guage of the second paragraph, which ex-
pressed an intention of the testatrix that a fee 
simple title to her property be conveyed to the 
children upon her death, was controlling. In re 
PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
rj^6mWi uevoiution of estate at death Restrictions. 
The power of a person to leave property by will and the rights of creditors, 
devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limita-
tions contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. 
Upon the death of a person his real and personal property devolves to persons 
to whom it is devised by his last will or to those indicated as substitutes for 
them in cases involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances affecting 
the devolution of testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, 
to his heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving 
renunciation or other circumstances affecting devolution of intestate estates, 
subject to homestead allowance, exempt property and family allowance, rights 
of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse, and administration. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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